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Abstract 
 
Surveillance-infused forms of algorithmic discrimination are beginning to capture public and scholarly attention. While this is an 
encouraging development, this editorial questions the parameters of this emerging discussion and cautions against algorithmic 
fetishism. I characterize algorithmic fetishism as the pleasurable pursuit of opening the black box, discovering the code hidden 
inside, exploring its beauty and flaws, and explicating its intricacies. It is a technophilic desire for arcane knowledge that can 
never be grasped completely, so it continually lures one forward into technical realms while deferring the point of intervention. 
The editorial concludes with a review of the articles in this open issue.       
 
 
 
In January 2018, New York City enacted a law—the first of its kind in the USA—aimed at curbing 
algorithmic discrimination (New York City Council 2018). The law will support the creation of a task 
force to survey the use of algorithms by city agencies, look for instances of discriminatory outcomes, and 
communicate those findings to the public (Kirchner 2017). These are clearly steps in the right direction, as 
the software processes that govern people’s lives and life chances are almost entirely black-boxed and 
propagating quickly; they are also prone to bias (Barocas and Selbst 2016; Noble 2018), as is the case with 
all sociotechnical systems.1 The overlaps with the criminal justice system are especially troubling. For 
instance, judges depend increasingly on algorithmic predictors of recidivism—or “risk assessments”—
when making decisions about sentencing or granting bail, yet those risk assessments have been shown to 
deliver significantly lower risk scores for white than for black defendants, even in the face of 
commonsense empirical evidence to the contrary (Angwin et al. 2016; Eubanks 2017). Such consequential 
scoring of individuals can manifest in just about any encounter individuals have with organizations, 
determining who gets financial credit, who gets a job, who is admitted to universities, who is given 
medical treatment, and so on (Gandy Jr. 2009; Richardson 2017). Surveillance studies scholars would 
rightly call these forms of social sorting (Lyon 2003), marginalizing surveillance (Monahan 2010), or 
racializing surveillance (Browne 2015), but what I want to trouble here is the reflexive reach for 
transparency—algorithmic or otherwise—as a solution.    
 
In the case of algorithmic discrimination, as with so many other cases surrounding surveillance problems, 
transparency is heralded as a vital first step in correcting social injustices spawned by algorithmic decision 
                                                      
1 It should also be pointed out that algorithms used by public agencies are barely the tip of the iceberg, as the 
systems operated by the private sector, especially those that constitute digital platforms such as Amazon, Google, or 
Facebook, are vast and radically reshaping social norms and functions, perhaps becoming markets or forms of 
governance in their own right (Pasquale 2017; Srnicek 2017). 
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making. As the ACLU declares, “Algorithms are not inherently evil. . . . But without transparency and a 
clear plan to address their flaws, they might do more harm than good” (Richardson 2017: n.p.). The logic 
is unsettling, though, because it does not exactly contest the integration of algorithmic systems into 
institutions or probe their infrastructural politics.2 Instead, it suggests that any offending algorithm could 
be replaced with a more fair or just substitute, provided that we shed sufficient light on the code to 
properly identify—and fix—its flaws.  
 
Just as proponents of new technological systems are disposed to fetishize them, I worry that scholars and 
civil society groups run a similar risk when calling for algorithmic transparency (e.g., ACM 2017; EPIC 
2015). From an academic perspective, even a critical one, algorithmic fetishism manifests in the 
pleasurable pursuit of opening the black box, discovering the code hidden inside, exploring its beauty and 
flaws, and explicating its intricacies.3 It is a technophilic desire for arcane knowledge that can never be 
grasped completely, so it continually lures one forward into technical realms while deferring the point of 
intervention. Following from other critiques of transparency projects, it is essential to bear in mind 
transparency’s roots in scientific epistemic cultures that were from the start limiting and exclusionary 
(Ananny and Crawford 2016; Haraway 1997; Knorr-Cetina 1999). More than that, calls for transparency 
resonate strongly with modern scientific rationalities that invite surveillance, quantification, and data 
analysis as the basis for decision making (Giddens 1990; Porter 1995; Scott 1998). It is a call for 
surveillance as a corrective to surveillance, which is an iterative mode that never breaks the cycle even 
when it repeatedly fails to actualize progressive social change (Brucato 2015; Hetherington 2011). 
 
While it is critical to open up the black box of algorithmic production, that will always be an insufficient 
response to the forms of discrimination engendered by them because algorithms cannot be separated from 
the context of their production and use. They do not act independent of social context, despite alarmist, 
deterministic narratives about their automated capacities. Racialized algorithmic violence, for instance, 
cannot be eradicated by tracing down the offending code and splicing it with an uncorrupted variant, as if 
the domain of computer code was or ever could be a pure dimension free from human prejudices and 
politics, as if “purity” were not an entirely bankrupt concept in the contemporary conjuncture. Clearly, the 
violence and prejudice of algorithms is, and always was, an extension of those qualities in societies. So, 
fetishizing algorithms, even from a critical position, risks sidelining the harder empirical, theoretical, and 
political work of tracing those links and creating a space for the emergence of more just alternatives. 
   
Overview of Articles 
 
Although the papers in this open issue are not about algorithms directly, they nicely demonstrate the 
strengths of surveillance studies to attend to the social and cultural contexts within which surveillance 
systems are deployed. They offer a counterpoint to the gravitational pull of algorithmic fetishism in a time 
when stories of data abuses by digital platforms (e.g., Facebook’s data sharing with Cambridge Analytica) 
dominate public attention.    
 
In the first article in the issue, Christoph Musik (2018) illustrates how smart cameras are not only black-
boxed but also discursively constructed as mystical entities whose functions defy conventional 
understanding. In emphasizing the agency of discrete artifacts like smart cameras, media outlets further 
occlude the wider sociotechnical systems that make such cameras operational, the norms enforced by the 
                                                      
2 I am thinking here of the insight from science and technology studies (STS) that categories and classification 
schemes possess a politics by their very design, in their structure and institutionalization, regardless of—or in 
addition to—their content (Bowker and Star 1999). Making the content or code transparent, or even altering that 
content or code, would not necessarily transform the social orders produced by such systems. 
3 Writing in a slightly different register, Kate Crawford (2016) also enjoins scholars to look “beyond algorithms as 
fetishized objects” (89) so that they could study the many actors involved in algorithm production and mediation. 
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systems, and especially the human agency and choices involved in designing, training, and maintaining 
the systems. In Musik’s case, the technology under investigation is an automatic toll sticker detection 
system that has been deployed on Austrian highways. He reveals that the scant media attention given to 
the system emphasized economic gain and the enforcement of laws—casting it in a positive light—not the 
elements of the system that purportedly make it “smart.” Through a process of familiarization, the 
innovative aspects of the system are downplayed: it is just another camera, albeit a somewhat “smarter” 
one than previous generations. The effect, though, is inoculation against public concern, cultivating tacit 
consent to ubiquitous surveillance systems with obscure, polyvalent functions. Technological 
somnambulism, to invoke Langdon Winner’s (1986) felicitous phrase, is not a natural state but rather one 
constantly, meticulously produced, even if unintentionally so.    
 
Mark A. Wood and Chrissy Thompson’s (2018) article on “crowdsourced countersurveillance” 
investigates roadway surveillance from another angle: that of citizens using publicly generated social-
media data to circumvent police camera traps and random breath-testing stations in Australia. As the 
authors illustrate, social media sites do not simply collect and convey information; rather, they play a vital 
role in the construction of public perceptions of and reactions to state surveillance ceremonies. At the 
same time, I would add, the creation of such shared online archives falls into the register of digital 
positivism. The amassing of visual photographic evidence, geotagged maps, and timestamps conveys an 
aura of robust empirical truth claims. These modes of engagement sidestep questions about the politics or 
indeterminacy of such positivistic representational practices. In other words, in this instance, 
countersurveillance efforts seek to combat the knowledge claims of the police (e.g., about speeding or 
intoxication) with alternative knowledge claims (e.g., about police locations) without pausing to reflect on 
the epistemological underpinnings or systemic outcomes of these evidentiary practices. Data imperatives 
and platform monopolies prevail, with all parties—even antagonistically positioned ones—contributing to 
their reproduction.     
 
At the same time, as Mike Zajko (2018) asserts in his article, there are fundamental tensions between the 
security objectives of different institutions and institutional actors. Intelligence agencies (e.g., NSA, 
GCHQ) generally seek to undermine security protections, while information technology (IT) security 
providers attempt to thwart such efforts. These insights are important in making sense of the wider 
ecology of national security. Seamless public-private partnerships may be a strategic intelligence goal 
(Regan, Monahan, and Craven 2015; Ball et al. 2015), but mission conflicts persist and can generate 
disjunctures that point toward both resistance possibilities and limitations. As Zajko posits: “IT security 
has become a means of resistance . . . [but] resistance should be a means to an end” (47-48). Privacy-
enhancing technologies and encryption efforts will always be insufficient without altering the political 
conditions that frame security imperatives in zero-sum terms, where the destabilization of others is 
perceived as necessary for self-protection.  
 
Josh A. Hendrix and his colleagues (2018) draw upon multiple quantitative datasets to argue that racial 
asymmetries between police departments and communities are an important factor in police adoption of 
surveillance systems. When mostly white police departments do not demographically represent the 
communities they serve, they are more likely to view racial minorities as dangerous outsiders in need of 
additional scrutiny. Thus, perceived social distance may be more important than policing objectives, crime 
rates, or budgets in determining the use of surveillance. As I would add, whether the surveillance systems 
are algorithmically driven or not, police perspectives on the need for such surveillance systems are infused 
with biases that motivate their adoption and guide their application. This empirically grounded article 
traces the outlines of such patterns and uncovers some of the likely reasons for them. 
 
In his piece on compulsory identification cards for Italian football (soccer) fans, Alberto Testa (2018) 
questions the implications of new state surveillance systems intended to prevent hooliganism in and 
around sporting events. Whereas there may be strong public safety rationales for excluding populations 
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deemed potentially dangerous, Testa argues that identity card schemes contribute to larger patterns in state 
governance regimes founded on legal exception. Fan identification cards may be normalized if 
symbolically associated with commercial loyalty cards, yet they require fans to submit to another layer of 
state surveillance operating on a quasi-legal parallel track. For Testa, the very fact of a system that 
requires one to furnish his or her papers (or cards) to authorities upon demand should disquiet anyone 
concerned about civil liberties and freedom.  
 
In the final article in this issue, Jeeshan Gazi (2018) performs a close reading of the 1998 experimental 
Japanese film Love & Pop. Shot with many digital cameras from a variety of angles (e.g., upskirt shots), 
this film—directed by Hideaki Anno—follows a Japanese schoolgirl engaging in disturbing encounters of 
“compensated dating” with older men. For Gazi, the film provides an early depiction of the kinds of self-
surveillance that characterize social media use today, particularly for women and girls who might 
internalize an awareness of the constant threat of being objectified. As Gazi writes, “the attempt to curate 
one’s virtual self depends on a self-management informed by paranoia” (97). Although I am not 
convinced that the film resists being read as an enactment of the misogynistic male gaze, as Gazi suggests, 
it can direct our attention and critiques to the formation and negotiation of gendered subjectivities in 
social-media saturated environments. 
 
 
References 
 
ACM. 2017. Statement on Algorithmic Transparency and Accountability. ACM US Public Policy Council, May 25. Available 
from https://http://www.acm.org/binaries/content/assets/public-policy/2017_joint_statement_algorithms.pdf [accessed 
March 29, 2018]. 
Ananny, Mike, and Kate Crawford. 2016. Seeing without knowing: Limitations of the transparency ideal and its application to 
algorithmic accountability. New Media & Society 20 (3):973-989  
Angwin, Julia, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu, and Lauren Kirchner. 2016. Machine Bias. ProPublica, May 23. Available from 
https://http://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing [accessed March 29, 
2018]. 
Ball, Kirstie, Ana Canhoto, Elizabeth Daniel, Sally Dibb, Maureen Meadows, and Keith Spiller. 2015. The Private Security 
State?: Surveillance, Consumer data and the War on Terror. Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School Press. 
Barocas, Solon, and Andrew D. Selbst. 2016. Big Data’s Disparate Impact. California Law Review 104 (3):671-732  
Bowker, Geoffrey C., and Susan Leigh Star. 1999. Sorting Things Out: Classification and its Consequences. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
Browne, Simone. 2015. Dark matters: On the surveillance of blackness. Durham: Duke University Press. 
Brucato, Ben. 2015. The New Transparency: Police Violence in the Context of Ubiquitous Surveillance. Media and 
Communication 3 (3):39-55  
Crawford, Kate. 2016. Can an algorithm be agonistic? Ten scenes from life in calculated publics. Science, Technology & Human 
Values 41 (1):77-92  
EPIC. 2015. Algorithmic Transparency: End Secret Profiling. Electronic Privacy Information Center, February 25. Available 
from https://http://www.epic.org/algorithmic-transparency/ [accessed March 29, 2018]. 
Eubanks, Virginia. 2017. Automating Inequality: How High-Tech Tools Profile, Police, and Punish the Poor. New York: St. 
Martin's Press. 
Gandy Jr., Oscar H. 2009. Coming to Terms with Chance: Engaging Rational Discrimination and Cumulative Disadvantage. 
Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
Gazi, Jeeshan. 2018. Soiveillance: Self-Consciousness and the Social Network in Hideaki Anno’s Love & Pop. Surveillance & 
Society 16 (1):84-111.  
Giddens, Anthony. 1990. The Consequences of Modernity. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 
Haraway, Donna J. 1997. Modest_Witness@Second_Millennium.FemaleMan_Meets_OncoMouse: Feminism and Technoscience. 
New York: Routledge. 
Hendrix, Josh A., Travis A. Taniguchi, Kevin J. Strom, Kelle Barrick, and Nicole J. Johnson. 2018. The Eyes of Law 
Enforcement in the New Panopticon: Police-Community Racial Asymmetry and the Use of Surveillance Technology. 
Surveillance & Society 16 (1):53-68.  
Hetherington, Kregg. 2011. Guerrilla auditors: the politics of transparency in neoliberal Paraguay. Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press. 
Kirchner, Lauren. 2017. New York City moves to create accountability for algorithms. Ars Technica, December 19. Available 
from https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/12/new-york-city-moves-to-create-accountability-for-algorithms/ 
[accessed March 29, 2018]. 
Monahan: Algorithmic Fetishism 
Surveillance & Society 16(1) 5 
Knorr-Cetina, K. 1999. Epistemic Cultures: How the Sciences Make Knowledge. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Lyon, David, ed. 2003. Surveillance as Social Sorting: Privacy, Risk, and Digital Discrimination. New York: Routledge. 
Monahan, Torin. 2010. Surveillance in the Time of Insecurity. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. 
Musik, Christoph. 2018. It’s the Camera! A Special One: The Smartboxing of Image Processing Algorithms and their 
Uncertainties in Media Representations of Surveillance Technology. Surveillance & Society 16 (1):6-19.  
New York City Council. 2018. Automated decision systems used by agencies. Legislative Research Center, January 11. Available 
from http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=3137815&GUID=437A6A6D-62E1-47E2-9C42-
461253F9C6D0 [accessed March 29, 2018]. 
Noble, Safiya Umoja. 2018. Algorithms of Oppression: How Search Engines Reinforce Racism. New York: New York University 
Press. 
Pasquale, Frank. 2017. From Territorial to Functional Sovereignty: The Case of Amazon. Law and Political Economy, December 
6. Available from https://lpeblog.org/2017/12/06/from-territorial-to-functional-sovereignty-the-case-of-amazon/ 
[accessed January 5, 2018]. 
Porter, Theodore M. 1995. Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Regan, Priscilla M., Torin Monahan, and Krista Craven. 2015. Constructing the Suspicious: Data Production, Circulation, and 
Interpretation by DHS Fusion Centers. Administration & Society 47 (6):740-762  
Richardson, Rashida. 2017. New York City Takes on Algorithmic Discrimination. American Civil Liberties Union, December 12. 
Available from https://http://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/new-york-city-takes-
algorithmic-discrimination [accessed March 29, 2018]. 
Scott, James C. 1998. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition have Failed. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
Srnicek, Nick. 2017. Platform Capitalism. Malden, MA: Polity. 
Testa, Alberto. 2018. The All-Seeing Eye of State Surveillance in the Italian Football (Soccer) Terraces: The Case Study of the 
Football Fan Card. Surveillance & Society 16 (1):69-83.  
Winner, Langdon. 1986. The Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of High Technology. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Wood, Mark A., and Chrissy Thompson. 2018. Crowdsourced Countersurveillance: A Countersurveillant Assemblage? 
Surveillance & Society 16 (1):20-38.  
Zajko, Mike. 2018. Security against Surveillance: IT Security as Resistance to Pervasive Surveillance. Surveillance & Society 16 
(1):39-52.  
 
 
 
